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Abstract
This study was designed to investigate the neural mechanism of cognitive modulation of pain via a reappraisal strategy with high
temporal resolution. The EEG signal was recorded from 29 participants who were instructed to down-regulate, up-regulate, or
maintain their pain experience. The L2 minimum norm source reconstruction method was used to localize areas in which a
significant effect of the instruction was present. Down-regulating pain by reappraisal exerted a robust effect on pain processing
from as early as ~100 ms that diminished the activity of limbic brain regions: the anterior cingulate cortex, right orbitofrontal
cortex, left anterior temporal region, and left insula. However, compared with the no-regulation condition, the neural activity was
similarly attenuated in the up- and down-regulation conditions. We suggest that this effect could be ascribed to the cognitive load
that was associated with the execution of a cognitively demanding reappraisal task that could have produced a general attenuation
of pain-related areas regardless of the aim of the reappraisal task (i.e., up- or down-regulation attempts). These findings indicate
that reappraisal effects reflect the joint influence of both reappraisal-specific (cognitive change) and unspecific (cognitive
demand) factors, thus pointing to the importance of cautiously selected control conditions that allow the modulating impact of
both processes to be distinguished.
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Introduction
Pain is not a direct readout of nociceptive input (Melzack,
1999). A large body of research has demonstrated that various
psychological interventions may alter the perception of its
intensity and the experience of concomitant emotions.
Therefore, in recent years there has been growing interest in
identifying the neural pathways associated with cognitive
modulation of pain experience (Edwards, Campbell,
Jamison, & Wiech, 2009; Legrain et al., 2012; Tracey, 2010;
Villemure & Bushnell, 2002; Wiech, 2016; Wiech, Ploner, &
Tracey, 2008). While attentional modulation of pain has been
extensively studied, the neuronal mechanisms that underlie
the impact on pain of higher-level cognitive processes have
only recently received empirical attention. Thus, in the present
study we examined the unknown temporal aspect of pain
modulation with the use of a cognitive reappraisal strategy
by determining the modulation sequence of neural sources
and tracking the observed effects in time. To our knowledge,
this is the first study that has adopted this approach to study
neural pain reappraisal effects.
The cognitive reappraisal strategy is regarded as one of the
most effective but also one of the most cognitively complex
forms of emotion regulation. It involves modifying one’s ap-
praisal of a situation to change its emotional impact (Gross,
2014). In typical reappraisal experiments, participants are pre-
sented with emotion-inducing visual material and are
instructed to generate their own alternative interpretations of
negatively valenced stimuli or to detach themselves fromwhat
they see. Regulatory effects are then contrasted with a passive
viewing condition in which participants are usually instructed
to simply pay attention to emotional pictures. Alteration in
stimuli meaning (cognitive change) is considered the primary
source of the regulatory effects of reappraisal.
Highlights
• Temporal aspects of cognitive modulation of pain via cognitive
reappraisal are investigated.
• Reappraisal showed both early (from ~100 ms) and late-latency effects,
with neural attenuation in both regulatory conditions.
• Reappraisal effects are driven by both cognitive change and unspecific
cognitive load.
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Within the field of pain research, however, cognitive reap-
praisal has been operationalized and measured differently by
different researchers. One line of research investigated reap-
praisal processes indirectly, regarding it as a mechanism that
underlies the beneficial effects of perceived control over pain
(Arntz & Claassens, 2004; Mohr, Leyendecker, Petersen, &
Helmchen, 2012; Salomons, Johnstone, Backonja, Shackman,
& Davidson, 2007; Salomons, Nusslock, Detloff, Johnstone,
& Davidson, 2014; Wiech et al., 2006). It was assumed that
beliefs about the controllability of pain would change the way
it is appraised, making it less threatening and subjectively
more manageable even when control is not exerted or is only
illusory. These studies revealed that controllable versus un-
controllable pain is indexed by increased activity in the dor-
solateral PFC, ventrolateral PFC and/or ventromedial PFC
(Mohr et al., 2012; Salomons et al., 2007, 2014; Wiech
et al., 2006). Furthermore, perceived control over pain was
associated with decreased activity in pain- and emotion-
related brain regions, such as the amygdala, anterior cingulate
cortex, insula, and secondary somatosensory cortex
(Salomons et al., 2014; Salomons et al., 2007; Wiech et al.,
2006). These findings were consistent with the vast majority
of fMRI studies in which participants were instructed to reap-
praise emotionally arousing visual material (Kim & Hamann,
2007; Ochsner et al., 2004; Silvers, Weber,Wager, &Ochsner,
2015; Wager, Davidson, Hughes, Lindquist, & Ochsner,
2008). Therefore, it was assumed that cognitive change or
change in stimulus appraisal was responsible for the changes
in neural activity.
Nonetheless, inferences drawn from the aforementioned
studies on reappraisal processes are indirect as none of these
studies manipulated the actual meaning of pain. Thus, another
line of research introduced an alternative approach: promoting
participants’ active involvement in achieving a self-regulatory
goal. To do so, some studies used positive self-statements,
e.g., “I can stand this” (Jokic-Begic, Ivanec, & Markanovic,
2009); some involved reinterpretation of sensory experiences,
e.g., imagining thermal stimulation as a hot bath (Fardo,
Allen, Jegindø, Angrilli, & Roepstorff, 2015; Hampton,
Hadjistavropoulos, Gagnon, Williams, & Clark, 2015;
Lapate et al., 2012; Woo, Roy, Buhle, & Wager, 2015); some
used verbal suggestions, e.g., convincing subjects that a pro-
cedure would improve their health (Benedetti, Thoen,
Blanchard, Vighetti, & Arduino, 2013; Hovasapian &
Levine, 2016); others combined some of the aforementioned
methods (Denson, Creswell, Terides, & Blundell, 2014;
Kalisch et al., 2005).
Down-regulating painful sensory experiences via reap-
praisal mitigated overestimation of remembered pain in anx-
ious individuals (Hovasapian & Levine, 2016), reduced facial
expression of pain (Hampton et al., 2015), and increased pain
tolerance (Jokic-Begic et al., 2009). It also was associated
with attenuation of self-reported indices of pain (Fardo et al.,
2015; Hampton et al., 2015; Lapate et al., 2012), although
inconsistently (Jokic-Begic et al., 2009), as well as modula-
tion of heart rate (Kalisch et al., 2005; Lapate et al., 2012),
corrugator electromyography responses (Lapate et al., 2012),
and neuroendocrine activity (Benedetti et al., 2013).
At the neural level, down-regulation of painful sensory
experiences resulted in modulation of activity in the medial
prefrontal/anterior cingulate cortex that was accompanied by
the subjective reduction of anticipatory anxiety (Kalisch et al.,
2005). In studies that included two regulatory conditions and
instructed participants to reinterpret their sensory experiences,
down- and up-regulation was associated with decreased and
increased activity in the bilateral amygdala (Lapate et al.,
2012), or increased and decreased activity in the nucleus ac-
cumbens (NAcc), respectively (Woo et al., 2015).
Furthermore, successful regulation, i.e., pain facilitation in
up-regulation and pain inhibition in down-regulation, was me-
diated by functional connectivity between the nucleus accum-
bens and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Woo et al.,
2015). Finally, Fardo et al. (2015) examined the effects of
narrative-based mental imagery by means of EEG recording
and observed modulation of the N2 potential, whose ampli-
tude increased and decreased in the down- and up-regulation
condition, respectively. In the down-regulation condition, the
source of these modulations (identified for the N2 time-
windows) was in the right frontal and temporal regions,
whereas in the up-regulation condition it was in the left insu-
lar, middle frontal, and primary motor cortex.
In summary, both lines of study revealed that various forms
of cognitive reappraisal modulate the activity of both cortical
(such as the anterior cingulate cortex, primary and secondary
somatosensory cortices, and insula) and subcortical brain areas
(such as the amygdala and nucleus accumbens) and that this
modulation originates mostly from prefrontal brain regions
(such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate
cortex, and/or ventrolateral prefrontal cortex) (Fardo et al.,
2015; Kalisch et al., 2005; Lapate et al., 2012; Mohr et al.,
2012; Salomons et al., 2007, 2014; Wiech et al., 2006; Woo
et al., 2015). These findings suggest that, similar to other cog-
nitive pain modulation procedures, reappraisal is associated
with changes in the frontal-limbic brainstem network
(Knudsen et al., 2011). Moreover, the neural activity pattern
that emerges from these studies is compliant with the one ob-
served in other paradigms that studied the impact of various
forms of suggestion or induced beliefs on perceived pain, such
as anticipation/placebo (Zubieta & Stohler, 2009) or hypnotic
suggestion (Del Casale et al., 2015). This indicates that chang-
ing themeaning of potentially threatening or unpleasant stimuli,
which is a driving force of reappraisal, may be a more universal
mechanism that underlies all forms of higher-level cognitive
pain modulation (Barber, 1957; Chen, 2009; van der Meulen,
Kamping, & Anton, 2017; Wiech et al., 2008). However, to the
best of our knowledge, none of the previous studies analyzed
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the exact time sequence of the observed neural modulations,
which would require a much more accurate temporal resolution
than the one offered by the functional resonance imaging
(fMRI) that was predominantly used in these studies.
Investigating this issue is of great importance as the identified
brain structures participate in various mental processes, and it
often is hard to distinguish their role based solely on their lo-
calization or interconnections with other brain areas. In this
context, other neuroimaging methods, such as electroencepha-
lography (EEG), that are characterized by superior temporal
resolution could be useful. They could distinguish between
early- and late-latency pain-modulation effects, which would
help in disentangling their role in cognitive pain modulation.
Thus, the goal of our study was to investigate the temporal
dynamics of higher-level cognitive modulation of pain sensa-
tions via reappraisal. Specifically, we aimed to track the activa-
tion sequence of the brain regions that are typically modulated
in various belief-induction procedures (Knudsen et al., 2011;
Tracey, 2010; Wiech et al., 2008). We hypothesized that we
would observe modulation at both early (<300 ms) and late
(>300 ms) pain-processing stages. More specifically, we as-
sumed that the effects of reappraisal would be apparent in the
modulation of the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), the
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), and the secondary somatosensory
cortex (SII)/insular cortex (IC), all of which are commonly
modulated structures in cognitive pain modulation studies and
have been implicated in both cognitive and affective-
motivational aspects of pain (Knudsen et al., 2011; Petrovic
& Ingvar, 2002; Wiech et al., 2008). Moreover, we expected
that these modulatory effects would be exerted by the ventral
and/or dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (PFC), both of which are
regions that have previously been identified as a source of
regulatory influences in pain (Mohr et al., 2012; Salomons
et al., 2014) and emotion (Buhle et al., 2014) reappraisal stud-
ies. However, we did not make any specific predictions regard-
ing the timing of the expected effects due to the repeated, bidi-
rectional information exchange between these structures at dif-
ferent stages of noxious stimulus processing (Tracey &
Mantyh, 2007). To obtain the latencies and location of reap-
praisal effects, we applied the EEG source localization method.
Additionally, we collected self-reports of pain intensity, pain
unpleasantness, and subjectively perceived efficiency in mod-
ulating pain experience according to the given instruction.
Although the majority of previous studies focused solely
on down-regulating pain sensations using various reappraisal
procedures, we included both up- and down-regulation condi-
tions. These conditions differed from each other only in the
direction ofmodulation attempts and were contrasted against a
no-regulation condition that was characterized by significant-
ly less intense cognitive activity. By incorporating these two
regulatory conditions, we aimed to control whether reapprais-
al would produce specific, directional, narrative-content-
based effects, or whether it would merely interfere with pain
processing by redirecting attention away from the source of
painful stimulation towards internal imagination-driven narra-
tion and/or by loading the executive systemwith a cognitively
demanding reappraisal task, regardless of its content.
Method
Subjects
Twenty-nine healthy women volunteers participated in the
study (mean age = 21.9 years; standard deviation [SD] =
1.3; range = 20–25 years). All participants were right-
handed with normal or corrected-to-normal vision. No partic-
ipant reported a history of pain disorders, neurological or psy-
chiatric disorders, or substance abuse. All of them provided
written, informed consent before the experiment and were
informed they could withdraw from the study at any time.
They received a reimbursement of €10. The study was ap-
proved by the Ethical Committee at the Institute of
Psychology of Jagiellonian University and was conducted in
accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
Apparatus and materials
The pain stimuli were electric shocks delivered to the inner
side of the left forearm through two durable stainless-steel
disk electrodes 8 mm in diameter with 30-mm spacing. Each
stimulus lasted 5 ms. Pain stimuli were delivered by the
Constant Current High Voltage Stimulator (model DS7AH,
Digitimer, Welwyn Garden City, England). Two levels of in-
tensities were administered to the participants, corresponding
to the ratings of 5 (mean = 19.17mA, SD= 10.32mA; range =
6–37 mA) and 7 (mean = 27.28 mA, SD = 15.11 mA; range =
8–55 mA) on a numerical rating scale (NRS). The levels were
determined individually for each subject during a calibration
task that was administered using PsychoPy software (Peirce,
2008) on a computer with a 61-cm LED monitor in order to
control the presentation and timing of the stimuli. For EEG
recording, a Biosemi Active Two EEG device was used that
was equipped with 64 sensors placed on a 10-10 head cap and
4 additional electrodes placed over the eye muscles. Data pro-
cessing was performed by means of EMEGS software (Peyk,
De Cesarei, & Junghöfer, 2011).
Procedure
Task description
Participants were asked to cognitively increase (up-regulate) or
decrease (down-regulate) the upcoming sensory stimulation
and to evaluate their pain experience (pain intensity, pain un-
pleasantness, and efficiency of pain control). At the beginning
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of each block, participants were delivered one of three short
instructions which indicated the upcoming condition. To bal-
ance the effort of generating their own reinterpretations be-
tween the two regulation conditions, we provided participants
with short instructions that encouraged them to visualize the
upcoming pain in either a more negative (up-regulation
condition) or more positive (down-regulation condition) way.
These served as examples that could be used by participants to
find their own interpretations. In the up-regulation condition,
participants were instructed to imagine that pain sensations
were dangerous electric shocks caused by an uninsulated cable.
In the down-regulation condition, participants were instructed
to imagine that pain sensations were the result of benevolent
therapeutic currents (electrotherapy) whose influence would
improve their overall functioning. In the case of these two reg-
ulatory conditions, participants were informed that they should
build on the provided instructions (e.g., by enriching them with
more details but without changing the core idea) to be able to
control successfully their pain sensations. In the control condi-
tion, the instruction required the pain to be experienced natu-
rally without any attempt to change the ongoing sensations or
concomitant emotions. At the end of each block, participants
were asked to rate the intensity and unpleasantness of the ex-
perienced pain and to judge their own efficiency in influencing
pain sensations according to the given instruction.
Although the instructions that we used were adapted from
classic reappraisal studies on emotion regulation and were
modelled after so-called situation-based reappraisal (for
more details on different forms of reappraisal, see Ochsner
et al., 2004), changing the meaning of painful somatosensory
stimulation is somewhat different than changing the meaning
of unpleasant visual stimulation, which is much less aversive
and much easier to reinterpret. Out of necessity, our procedure
relied more on the mental imagery component, which is better
suited to controlling affective experience induced in a somato-
sensory modality (Fernandez & Turk, 1989), than on the nar-
rative component, which demands stimulation that is richer in
detail. Furthermore, during the training we gave our partici-
pants extended reappraisal instructions to provide guidance on
how to accomplish the reappraisal task correctly. However,
these instructions were shorter during the main experiment
and participants were encouraged to either develop their
own ideas on how to reinterpret the ongoing pain or to build
upon the provided examples. Thus, our procedure was some-
what different from similar belief-induction procedures, such
as hypnotic or placebo suggestion paradigms (Kiernan, Dane,
Phillips, & Price, 1995; Ploghaus, 1999; Wager et al., 2004),
as it demanded a more active attitude towards pain.
Procedure
Upon arrival at the laboratory, a brief description of the exper-
iment was provided to participants (registering brain activity
while undergoing electric stimulation and performing regula-
tory tasks). Participants were then asked to fill in a written,
informed consent form. Subsequently, the bipolar electrode
was attached to the volar side of the left forearm over the
median nerve; a calibration task identifying two levels of pain
stimuli for each participant then started. Participants were in-
formed that the purpose of this part of the experiment was to
determine the stimulation intensity levels that would be used
during the main procedure. The experimenter administered a
series of trials of ascending and descending intensity (starting
intensity 1 mA; step 1 mA) and recorded the participants’
responses. Participants rated the intensity of each stimulus
on an 11-point numerical rating scale (NRS) ranging from 0
(no pain) to 10 (the worst imaginable pain). They then rested
for approximately 2 minutes while the experimenter calculat-
ed the average values (mA levels) corresponding to 5 and 7
(the values that were chosen for the experimental procedure)
on the NRS. Then, written and oral instructions describing the
experimental task were provided, and a brief training session
consisting of six blocks (2 for each condition) started.
Descriptions used in the training session were as follows.
For the up-regulation condition (UPREG): “INCREASE
PAIN. Imagine that the ongoing pain is a result of a strong
electric shock caused by a noninsulated cable. Think how
dangerous this shock is for your life and the great pain it
causes.” For the down-regulation condition (DWREG):
“DECREASE PAIN. Imagine that the ongoing stimulation is
a result of therapeutic currents, so-called “electrotherapy,”
whose influence will improve the harmonized functioning of
your organism, streamline blood circulation, oxygenate the
tissues, and allow you to relax better.” For the control condi-
tion (NOREG): “MAINTAIN PAIN. Experience pain natural-
ly, without attempting to change the ongoing sensations or
emotions.” All participants reported that the six training
blocks were sufficient for the task to be understood. After
the training session the EEG equipment was mounted.
The experimental task consisted of 30 blocks, 10 for each
condition (Fig. 1A). Each block started with a shortened ver-
sion of one of the three instructions used in the training ses-
sion, informing the participant of the upcoming condition (i.e.,
the up-regulation, down-regulation, or no-regulation condi-
tion). Instructions were as follows. For the up-regulation con-
dition: “INCREASE PAIN. Imagine that pain sensations are
dangerous electric shocks being caused by a noninsulated ca-
ble.” For the down-regulation condition: “DECREASE PAIN.
Imagine that pain sensations are the result of benevolent ther-
apeutic currents (electrotherapy), whose influence will im-
prove your overall functioning.” For the no-regulation condi-
tion: “MAINTAIN PAIN. Experience pain naturally, without
attempting to change the ongoing sensations or concomitant
emotions.” The instruction was presented for 5 s and was
followed by a short preparation period (4 s). Then, a set of 8
stimuli of one predefined intensity (corresponding to the
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subject’s rating of 5 or 7 on the NRS) was delivered, separated
from each other by a 3–4 s interstimulus interval (Fig. 1B).
The duration of each stimuli was 5 ms. Importantly, partici-
pants were not informed that only two levels of pain intensity
were administered. Blocks were concluded with rating scales
presented on the horizontal visual-analogue scales (VASs). On
the first scale, participants rated the experienced painfulness
(“Howmuch pain did you feel?”; 0 = no pain, 100 = the worst
imaginable pain). On the second scale, they rated the experi-
enced unpleasantness (“How unpleasant did you feel?”; 0 = no
unpleasantness; 100 = the worst unpleasant pain). Finally, in
the up- and down-regulation blocks, participants were asked
to rate their efficiency in influencing the pain experience
(“How efficient were you in influencing your sensations?”; 0
= not efficient; 10 = very efficient). A 1-s interval separated
the consecutive blocks. The blocks were presented with one of
two pseudo-randomized orders to counterbalance order ef-
fects: N N D, D, U, U, N N U, U, D, D, U, U, D, D, N N U,
U, D, D, N N D, D, U, U, N N or D, D, N N U, U, N N U, U,
D, D, D, D, U, U, NND, D, NNU,U, NNU,U, D, D (where
N corresponds to the no-regulation condition, D to the down-
regulation condition, U to the up-regulation condition).
Data analysis
EEG preprocessing and data analysis
The sampling was set to 256 Hz. The signal was filtered using
0.1-Hz high-pass and 46-Hz low-pass zero-phase filters and
referenced to the averaged potential from all headcap elec-
trodes. Ocular artifacts were corrected using Biosig toolbox
(Schlögl, Vidaurre, & Sander, 2011): the signal was epoched
in −100 to 1,000 ms time windows relative to electric stimu-
lation onset; it was baseline corrected using the mean
prestimulus value in the range of −100 to 0 ms. Artifact rejec-
tion using the method for statistical control of artifacts in high-
density EEG/MEG data then followed (SCADA; Junghöfer,
Elbert, Tucker, & Rockstroh, 2000); it included detection of
individual channel and global artifacts, interpolation of
rejected sensors, and verification of the stability of the trials
across the whole recording by computing their variance.
Remaining epochs were averaged across conditions. Finally,
the L2 minimum-norm inverse modeling method
(Hämäläinen & Ilmoniemi, 1994) was used to estimate the
activity of cortical sources contributing to the scalp signal.
The spherical shell consisting of 350 evenly distributed dipole
pairs was used as a head model with a radius of 90% of the
averaged head (roughly corresponding to gray matter depth),
with the Tikhonov regularization parameter k set to 0.1. The
resulting topography maps were projected onto a realistic
brain geometry (Bröckelmann et al., 2013). To reveal spatio-
temporal differences in brain activation between reappraisal
conditions, a nonparametric cluster-mass statistical procedure
with correction for multiple comparisons was applied (Maris
& Oostenveld, 2007). This approach is entirely data driven
and yields the spatial and temporal extent of the significant
effect without prior assumption of particular ROIs or time
windows. According to this procedure, all t-values which
exceeded critical alpha-levels (p = 0.05; sensor-level criterion)
were summed across neighboring dipoles (located within an
angle of 120 degrees from the vertex, which roughly reflects
cortical dipoles) and adjacent time points in order to form
spatiotemporal clusters comprised of electrodes/samples,
which reached the assumed significance level. The number
Fig. 1 a Timeline of a single block; b Timeline of the stimulation.
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of these electrodes/samples together with their effect strength
are considered as cluster mass, which together describe the
spatiotemporal extent of the cluster. For the sake of clarity,
we will refer to the masses as neural activations. Then, the
masses of all obtained clusters were compared against a ran-
dom permutation cluster-based alpha-level (cluster-level cri-
terion; p = 0.05) that was established via Monte Carlo simu-
lations (1,000 permutations) (Wessing, Rehbein, Postert,
Fürniss, & Junghöfer, 2013). The only clusters reported were
those whose spatiotemporal extent reflected by the obtained
masses exceeded the critical cluster-level threshold. Finally,
the resulting clusters were subjected to ANOVA statistics to
determine the effects of reappraisal condition and intensity.
Additionally, a classic ERP analysis was performed by which
we estimated the effect of condition on the N2-P2 mean am-
plitude difference at the typically analyzed vertex Cz electrode
(Albu & Meagher, 2019; Bromm & Lorenz, 1998; Meier,
Klucken, Soyka, & Bromm, 1993; von Mohr, Krahé, Beck,
& Fotopoulou, 2018) using 100–130 ms and 220–260 ms
time-windows, respectively. To examine the impact of differ-
ent tasks on the N2-P2 amplitudes, a one-way repeated mea-
sures ANOVAwas conducted with the Instruction (down-reg-
ulation, no-regulation, up-regulation) as the repeated-measure
factor.
Subjective ratings analysis
In order to examine the impact of the different tasks (up-reg-
ulation, down-regulation, no-regulation condition) on subjec-
tive ratings of perceived pain intensity and unpleasantness and
with respect to two stimulus intensities, two-way repeated
measures ANOVAs were conducted. To assess mean differ-
ences in subjective efficiency ratings between the two regula-
tory conditions (up- and down-regulation) and with respect to
the two stimulus intensities (moderate and high), a two-way
repeated measures ANOVA was applied. Statistical signifi-
cance was set at p < 0.05 and effect sizes were calculated using
the partial η2. The Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied
if needed, and adjusted p-values are reported. In the case of
significant effects, the Bonferroni correction was used for
post-hoc comparisons.
Results
Subjective ratings data
Participants reported significant differences in perceived pain
intensity and unpleasantness according to the given instruc-
tion. Compared with no-regulation (NOREG), the up-
(UPREG) and down-regulation (DWREG) conditions were
associated with significantly increased or decreased intensity
and unpleasantness ratings, respectively (Figs. 2A and 2B).
The main effect of instruction for subjectively perceived pain
intensity ratings corresponded to F(2,56) = 66.10, p < 0.001,
partial η2 = 0.70. The instruction main effect for subjective
unpleasantness ratings was F(1.64,45.9) = 61.85, p < 0.001,
partial η2 = 0.69 (Figure 2).
Furthermore, stimulus intensity influenced both perceived
pain intensity and unpleasantness ratings, irrespective of the
given task. When the applied stimulus was of moderate inten-
sity, the mean subjective intensity rating was 3.69 (SE = 0.23)
and the mean subjective unpleasantness rating was 3.74 (SE =
0.26). Conversely, when the applied stimulus was of high
intensity, the mean subjective intensity rating was 5.29 (SE
= 0.26) and the mean subjective unpleasantness rating was
5.51 (SE = 0.38). The main effect of stimulus intensity for
subjective intensity ratings was F(1,28) = 97.42, p < 0.001,
partial η2 = 0.78. The main effect of instruction for subjective
unpleasantness ratings was F(1,28) = 36.53, p < 0.001, partial
η2 = 0.57. However, the interaction effects between instruc-
tion and stimulus intensity for both perceived pain intensity
and unpleasantness ratings yielded insignificant results:
F(2,56) = 2.30, p = 0.11, and F(1.15,32.31) = 0.20, p =
0.691, respectively.
Participants also were instructed to rate their efficiency in
influencing pain sensations according to the given instruction.
The results revealed that the perceived efficiency ratings for
down- and up-regulation did not differ: F(1,28) = 0.449, p =
0.508). Participants reported feeling equally capable of down-
regulating (mean rating = 6.23, SE = 0.35) and up-regulating
(mean rating = 6.15, SE = 0.32) their sensory experience (Fig.
2C). However, further analyses revealed that participants’ ef-
ficiency ratings were influenced by stimulus intensity as there
was a significant interaction between instruction and stimulus
intensity: F(1,28) = 37.53, p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.57. All
comparisons yielded significant results: participants reported
being more efficient (p < 0.001) at down-regulating moderate-
intensity stimuli (mean rating = 6.50, SE = 0.34) than at up-
regulating them (mean rating = 5.79, SE = 0.32) or at down-
regulating high-intensity stimuli (p = 0.003); they were more
efficient (p = 0.015) at up-regulating high-intensity stimuli
(mean rating = 6.43, SE = 0.34) than at down-regulating them
(mean rating = 6.04, SE = 0.37) or at up-regulating moderate-
intensity stimuli (p < 0.001).
EEG data
Four brain clusters were found in which the main effect of the
reappraisal condition was observed: the anterior cingulate cor-
tex (ACC) in the early 90–145 ms window relative to stimulus
onset (F(2,56) = 8.45; p = 0.001; Figs. 3A and 4A); the right
orbitofrontal cortex (ROFC) in the 188–288 ms time window
(F(2,56)=4.61; p = 0.017; Figs. 3B and 4B); the left anterior
temporal area (LATmp) in the 191–266 ms window
(F(2,56)=16.49; p < 0.001; Figs. 3C and 4C); and the left
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frontotemporal area, identified as the left insula (LIns) in the
late 762–801 ms time window (F(2,56) = 14.62; p < 0.001;
Table 1 Figs. 3D and 4D). Post-hoc comparisons revealed that
all the identified clusters showed a similar pattern of activation
changes, with the highest value observed in the control con-
dition (NOREG) compared to at least one of the regulation
(UPREG or DWREG) instructions. For the ACC, higher ac-
tivation was recorded in the NOREG compared with the
UPREG condition (p = 0.003). For the ROFC, activation
was higher in the NOREG than in the UPREG condition (p
= 0.011). For the LATmp, activation was higher in the control
condition compared to both the UPREG and DWREG condi-
tions (p = 0.001). Interestingly, post hoc tests yielded all sig-
nificant comparisons for the LIns. Higher activation was ob-
served for the control condition compared with the up-
regulation condition (p = 0.025) and the down-regulation con-
dition (p < 0.001). Additionally, there was a significant differ-
ence between the regulation conditions, with greater activity
in the UPREG condition (p = 0.003). The effect of intensity
was also observed for all clusters, with higher activation for
more intensive stimulation: F(1,28) = 76.67; p < 0.001 for the
ACC cluster; F(1,28) = 22.73; p < 0.001 for the ROFC area;
F(1,28) = 57.06; p < 0.001 for the LATmp;F(1,28) = 6.79; p =
0.015 for the left insular cluster. Finally, our analysis of the
ERP components revealed that reappraisal tasks successfully
modulated the N2-P2 mean amplitude difference: F(2,56) =
13.25, p < 0.001; η2= 0.314 (Fig. 5). This is consistent with
the neural modulation pattern of the identified clusters. Post
hoc comparisons confirmed that both down- (M = −11.58; SD
= 5.88) and up-regulation (M = −11.59; SD = 6.00) tasks
reduced the N2-P2 mean amplitude difference (p < 0.001)
compared with the no-regulation task (M = −12.82; SD =
5.99), but there was no significant difference between them
(p = not significant [ns]).
Discussion
Using a cutting-edge EEG source localization method, the
goal of the present study was to examine the temporal
dynamics of reappraisal effects on neural processing of
nociceptive input and its influence on the subjective per-
ception of pain. Participants were asked to reinterpret the
meaning and source of the upcoming painful stimulation
Fig. 2 Subjective ratings for down-regulation condition (DWREG), no-regulation condition (NOREG) and up-regulation condition (UPREG). A Mean
and SEM of pain intensity ratings; B Mean and SEM of pain unpleasantness ratings; C Mean and SEM for efficiency ratings.
Table 1. Neural activations (masses) of clusters (M±SE) by condition
DWREG NOREG UPREG
ACC (90–145 ms) 122.22 ± 11.10 127.30 ± 11.46 115.83 ± 10.68
Right OFC (188–288 ms) 60.10 ± 5.12 64.81 ± 5.76 62.83 ± 5.16
Left ATmp (191–266 ms) 63.99 ± 3.14 69.98 ± 3.81 65.70 ± 3.56
Left Ins (762–801 ms) 41.17 ± 2.42 52.20 ± 4.10 45.57 ± 2.55
ACC Anterior cingulate cortex, OFC Orbitofrontal cortex, ATmp Anterior temporal area, NOREG No regulation condition, UPREG Upregulation
condition, DWREG Downregulation condition. The values in the table are divided by a factor of 100.
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using a narrative-based mental imagery task (down- and
up-regulation condition) or to “allow their emotions and
thoughts to arise freely” (no-regulation condition) follow-
ing the application of pain stimuli. By incorporating and
contrasting the two regulatory conditions, we aimed to dis-
cern whether reappraisal would produce specific narrative-
content-based effects that increased and decreased pain ex-
perience according to the given instruction, or whether it
would merely interfere with pain processing by redirecting
attention away from the source of painful stimulation to-
wards internal imagery-driven narration and/or by increas-
ing the mental load induced by a cognitively demanding
reappraisal task, regardless of its content.
We found robust evidence that reappraisal modulated neu-
ral processing of nociceptive input from as early as 100 ms
onwards: the main effect of instruction was identified for four
clusters of neuronal activation localized within the anterior
cingulate cortex (90–145 ms), the right orbitofrontal cortex
(188–288 ms), and the left anterior temporal region (191–
266 ms), all of which can be considered early latency effects,
and the left insula (762-801 ms), which is a relatively late
latency effect. Neural modulation was accompanied by mod-
ulation of subjective ratings: participants reported reduced
pain and unpleasantness in the down-regulation condition
and, conversely, enhanced pain and unpleasantness in the
up-regulation condition relative to the no-regulation
Fig. 3 Main effects of instruction for clusters of neural activation in down-regulation condition (DWREG), no-regulation condition (NOREG), and up-
regulation condition (UPREG).
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condition. Furthermore, they assessed themselves as being
equally successful in decreasing and increasing pain.
Temporal sequence of neural modulation
Early latency effects (<300 ms)
Anterior cingulate cortex The earliest modulatory effects of
reappraisal were reflected in ACC activation (90–145 ms; Fig.
4A). The magnitude of its response was significantly smaller
in the up-regulation condition compared with the no-
regulation condition, but the difference between the up- and
down-regulation conditions was non-significant. Although the
ACC is one of the most consistently activated structures in
both emotion (Phan, Wager, Taylor, & Liberzon, 2002) and
pain studies (Peyron, Laurent, & García-Larrea, 2000), its
function differs significantly depending on the ACC subdivi-
sion and the timing of observed effects. The dorsal-caudal
ACC subdivision serves a function that is common to pain,
negative affect and cognitive control, detecting events or in-
ternal states and signaling a need to intensify or redirect atten-
tion or to strengthen top-down control in order to prevent a
Fig. 4 EEG clusters showing a significant main effect of instruction with respect to their timing.
Fig. 5 Grand averaged waveforms at the vertex (Cz electrode) showing the N2-P2 complex evoked by down-regulation condition (DWREG), no-
regulation condition (NOREG), and up-regulation condition (UPREG).
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potential threat or future error (Botvinick, Carter, Braver,
Barch, & Cohen, 2001; Shackman et al., 2011). The ventral-
rostral subdivision of the ACC, which exchanges reciprocal
connections with the amygdala, has been implicated in the
perception of pain unpleasantness in both experimental
(Rainville, Duncan, Price, Carrier, & Bushnell, 1997) and
clinical studies (Foltz & White, 1962). Importantly, attenua-
tion of ACC activity has been observed in studies examining
the effects of perceived control over pain (Mohr et al., 2012;
Salomons et al., 2007, 2014; Wiech et al., 2006) and reap-
praisal of pain sensations via mental detachment (Kalisch
et al., 2005), thus indicating that cognitive manipulation of
pain meaning was capable of decreasing its motivational val-
ue. On the other hand, decrease of pain-evoked activity in the
ACC has been reported in studies examining the regulatory
effects of attention-demanding cognitive tasks that were unre-
lated to the meaning of nociceptive stimulation (Bantick et al.,
2002; Frankenstein, Richter, McIntyre, & Rémy, 2001; Rémy,
Frankenstein, Mincic, Tomanek, & Stroman, 2003;
Seminowicz & Davis, 2007; Valet et al., 2004; Wiech et al.,
2005), thus suggesting that tasks that are sufficiently engaging
are capable of diminishing pain-related salience. Finally, ac-
tivity of the ACC also is sensitive to expectancy manipula-
tions; whereas expectations of high stimulus intensity cause
an increase in the anticipatory activity of the ACC, expec-
tations of low stimulus intensity decrease its activity
(Fairhurst, Wiech, Dunckley, & Tracey, 2007; Koyama,
McHaffie, Laurienti, & Coghill, 2005). The variety of pro-
cedures that involve ACC modulation suggests that it is
engaged in different pain processes; however, these are hard
to distinguish given the poor temporal resolution of fMRI.
Although the limited spatial resolution of EEG does not
unequivocally show which of the ACC subdivisions con-
tributed to the observed effect, on the basis of the timing of
the neural modulation effect we can hypothesize which psy-
chological process was modulated. On the one hand, con-
sidering the successive modulation pattern of the adjacent
limbic structures, it is possible that it reflected the reduced
emotional responding that took place in its “affective” sub-
division. On the other hand, considering that modulation
was observed very early (90–145 ms), it most probably
originated in the ACC’s “cognitive” subdivision and
reflected involuntary redirection of attention away from
the cognitive task and towards the salient and threatening
nociceptive stimulation (Dowman, 2004; Eccleston &
Crombez, 1999; Peyron et al., 1999, 2000) that took place
in the down- and no-regulation conditions but was absent in
the up-regulation condition, whose task might have encour-
aged participants to monitor the onset of nociceptive stim-
ulation. Similar timing of ACCmodulation was observed in
a study in which participants were subjected to a simulta-
neous painful conditioning and distraction procedure
(Moont, Crispel, Lev, Pud, & Yarnitsky, 2012).
Orbitofrontal cortexWithin the 188–288ms time window, we
observed the hypothesized modulation of the right
orbitofrontal cortex (Fig. 4B), which showed diminished ac-
tivity in the down-regulation condition compared with the no-
regulation condition but did not differ from the up-regulation
condition. Orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) activation has been ob-
served during the experience of a wide range of affective states
(Berridge & Kringelbach, 2008; O’Doherty, Kringelbach,
Rolls, Hornak, & Andrews, 2001), including pain (Tracey,
2010; Wiech, Seymour, Kalisch, Stephan, et al., 2005).
Moreover, it has been suggested that the activity of the right
lateral OFC represents the magnitude of expected costs or the
punishing value of the stimulus (Grabenhorst & Rolls, 2011;
O’Doherty et al., 2001), which is integratedwith and informed
by relevant contextual information and thus produces a con-
ceptually enriched affect (Roy, Shohamy, & Wager, 2012).
Furthermore, because it is densely connected with regions that
code for affective components of pain, such as the ACC, the
insula, and the amygdala (Kringelbach & Rolls, 2004), acti-
vation of the lateral OFC is commonly correlated with the
subjective unpleasantness of pain experience (Plassmann,
O’Doherty, & Rangel, 2010; Rolls et al., 2003; Seymour
et al., 2005; Wiech et al., 2005) and is thought to reflect
emotional-motivational appraisal of pain (Seymour et al.,
2005; Wiech et al., 2006; Wiech et al., 2005). Thus, in line
with other studies utilizing aversive stimulation, the right OFC
deactivation observed in the down-regulation condition most
probably reflected attenuated emotional responding (Rolls,
2003; Seymour et al., 2005; Wiech et al., 2005). The observed
timing, which resembles the pattern of OFC responses during
valence discrimination (starting around 100 ms post-stimulus
and reaching a maximum at around 180 ms (Kawasaki et al.,
2001) further supports this interpretation. It is plausible that at
this stage of processing the intrinsically aversive value of the
pain stimulus was integrated with instruction-appropriate con-
ceptual framing, which resulted in reevaluation of its meaning
(cognitive change). Conversely, the lack of a similar increase
of neural response in the up-regulation condition supports the
role of nonspecific cognitive activity in the attenuation of
affective responding that is observed in typical emotional con-
trol tasks used in laboratory procedures.
Anterior Temporal Lobe In the 191–266 ms time window, we
found modulation of the left anterior temporal area (Fig. 4C),
whose activity was attenuated in both regulation conditions
compared with the no-regulation condition. The limited spa-
tial resolution of our method does not allow for unequivocal
conclusions about the exact location of the source structure,
which could be either the anterior part of the temporal lobe or
the amygdalar complex. The latter possibility could be sup-
ported by the well-known role of this structure in representing
the motivational value of stimulation (especially for negative
valence) and the relatively early onset of this effect
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(Sabatinelli, Lang, Bradley, Costa, & Keil, 2009). The amyg-
dala plays a critical role in emotional response to pain and in
pain modulation; it integrates nociceptive information with
internal (e.g., affective (Roy, Piche, Chen, Peretz, &
Rainville, 2009)) and external (e.g., environmental (Atlas,
Bolger, Lindquist, & Wager, 2010)) states, thus facilitating
or inhibiting pain processing in different areas of the brain.
Pain-related amygdala activity also is susceptible to concep-
tual manipulations of the meaning of pain; its activity has been
shown to increase or decrease depending on the reappraisal
instructions (Lapate et al., 2012) and is modulated by the
manipulation of perceived control over pain (Salomons
et al., 2007, 2014; Wiech et al., 2006). On the other hand,
the temporal poles, which are considered by some authors to
constitute an “extended limbic system,” also are related to
processing of emotional stimuli (Olson, Plotzker, & Ezzyat,
2007). In line with the current results, activity of the left an-
terior temporal cortex has been shown to increase together
with subjective ratings of negative emotions in response to
negatively valenced stimuli (Wyczesany & Ligeza, 2014).
Consistently with the activation of the right OFC, for which
a similar modulation pattern was observed in the overlapping
time window (188–288 ms), the pattern of amygdala/LATmp
modulation could reflect the process of affective elaboration
of pain stimuli. Such temporal synchrony with the OFC indi-
cates a process of valence elaboration, which is consistent
with the current views on the role of these regions (Pessoa &
Adolphs, 2010) and the typical timing of amygdala modula-
tion (Sabatinelli et al., 2009).
Late latency effects (>300 ms)
Last but not least, we observed modulation of the left insular
cortex within the 762–801 ms time window (Fig. 4D).
Interestingly, all comparisons yielded significant effects: acti-
vation was lowest in the down-regulation condition and
highest in the no-regulation condition. The insula often is
bilaterally activated during noxious stimulation (Coghill
et al., 1994); however, its modulation is observed in both early
and late pain processing stages, suggesting that multiple func-
tions are served by this structure (Moont, Crispel, Lev, Pud, &
Yarnitsky, 2011; Moont et al., 2012). While the anterior insula
tracks affective-motivational aspects of pain processing and
contributes to interoceptive awareness (Craig, 2002), stimulus
intensity is coded in the posterior insula (Craig, Chen, Bandy,
& Reiman, 2000). It has been proposed that the insula inte-
grates information about one’s current bodily and affective
states with higher-level cognitive information concerning the
current (task) goals and afferent sensory processing (Starr
et al., 2009). Moreover, the anterior insular cortex has been
identified as an important node of the salience network, which
includes the dorsal ACC and other subcortical limbic regions
(Lindquist, Wager, Kober, Bliss-Moreau, & Barrett, 2012;
Uddin, 2015). The fact that the anterior insula is implicated
in both affective integration and cognitive control indicates
that it promotes reappraisal success; indeed, modulation of
this structure has been consistently observed across various
reappraisal studies (Fardo, Allen, Jegindø, Angrilli, &
Roepstorff, 2015; Salomons, Johnstone, Backonja,
Shackman, & Davidson, 2007; Salomons, Nusslock, Detloff,
Johnstone, & Davidson, 2014; Starr et al., 2009; Wiech et al.,
2006; Woo, Roy, Buhle, &Wager, 2015). Late deactivation of
the left insula (>550 ms post-stimulus) also was reported in an
EEG study with pain modulation using distraction (Moont
et al., 2012). Considering the relatively late insular activation
(~800 ms), its integrative function, and its similar pattern of
activation to those reported above, it is possible that modula-
tion of the insular cortex observed in our study reflected the
resultant activity of all the aforementioned structures. Here,
the signals concerning emotional state, current task goals, and
incoming sensory information converged, replicating the gen-
eral pattern of modulation observed in other limbic areas that
is apparent in an overall decrease in neural activity observed in
(up- and down-) regulation versus no-regulation conditions,
but this time accompanied by an increase in neural activity in
the up- versus down-regulation condition.
Question of the specificity of the instruction effect
In summary, we found extensive evidence that reappraisal
modulated neural processing of nociceptive input at both early
and late stages of pain processing. The observed pattern of
neuronal activation indicates that reappraisal influenced the
affective-evaluative aspect of pain processing by modulating
the activity of the “rostral limbic system” (Devinsky et al.,
1995).
However, contrary to our expectations and the available
literature, we observed a non-specific attenuation of neural
response to pain in one or both regulatory conditions com-
pared with the no-regulation condition. Apart from the left
insula, the neural response to pain in the down-regulation
condition was indistinguishable from the neural response in
the up-regulation condition. Assuming that the activity of the
identified neural sources reflected the depth of processing of
the nociceptive input at its different stages, this consistent
modulation pattern appears to indicate that the attenuating
effect of cognitive reappraisal can largely be considered
nonspecific.
The above interpretation appears to be supported by several
pieces of independent evidence. First, although all identified
clusters were localized blindly, i.e., without previous assump-
tions or predetermination of regions of interest (ROIs), their
location is compliant with structures that show a consistent
increase in activity when processing nociceptive input
(Apkarian, Bushnell, Treede, & Zubieta, 2005; Peyron et al.,
2000; Tracey & Mantyh, 2007; Wager et al., 2013). This
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finding suggests that their activity can be treated as a measure
of the neural response to pain, yet it obviously reflects its
various separate subprocesses that are engaged in generating
an appropriate, context-dependent response to pain.
Furthermore, neuroanatomical studies have demonstrated that
all four structures are densely (and often bidirectionally) inter-
connected and that by sending and receiving projections from
one another they are capable of affecting each other’s activity
when processing nociceptive input (Beckmann, Johansen-
Berg, & Rushworth, 2009; Craig, 2009; Kringelbach &
Rolls, 2004). This observation could explain the observed
consistency of the modulation pattern of each structure’s ac-
tivity (NOREG > DWREG, NOREG > UPREG, DWREG ≠
UPREG). Finally, it has been suggested that the rostro-dorsal
ACC, lateral OFC, amygdala, and anterior insula constitute
the brain’s negative appraisal system, whose activity indexes
the effectiveness of negative emotion regulation via reapprais-
al (Wager et al., 2008). This finding lends further support to
the assumption that activation of all four identified brain re-
gions reflects the intensity of processing of nociceptive input
and thus might be treated as a proxy for the regulatory effects
of reappraisal.
Mechanism that drove the reappraisal effects
Our results suggest that in addition to cognitive change, reg-
ulatory effects are also driven by other factors that are nonspe-
cific to the cognitive reappraisal strategy per se. This finding
stands in contrast to other studies that examined the neural
mechanisms that underlie cognitive modulation of pain using
both “passive” (i.e., examining effects of perception of pain
controllability; (Mohr et al., 2012; Salomons et al., 2007,
2014; Wiech et al., 2006)) and “active” reappraisal procedures
(i.e., instructing participants to actively achieve a self-
regulatory goal; (Fardo et al., 2015; Kalisch et al., 2005;
Lapate et al., 2012; Woo et al., 2015)). The question of why
this pattern of results emerged in our study thus arises. After
careful scrutiny of the current literature, we suggest that this
discrepant finding could have arisen due to several factors.
First of all, some studies intermixed different methods of re-
ducing emotional responses to pain (Denson et al., 2014;
Kalisch et al., 2005), which ultimately makes it impossible
to assess which of them actually contributed to the observed
modulatory effects. For instance, Kalisch et al. (2005)
instructed their participants not only to detach themselves
from the painful somatosensory stimulation by imagining that
they were in their “special” and safe place but also to generate
positive self-statements and to relax their muscles by
deploying a technique that they were taught at the beginning
of the experiment.
Secondly, although a large body of literature indicates that
perceived controllability over pain results in a robust modula-
tion of the pain experience, the conclusions that these
benevolent effects are primarily driven by cognitive change
are inferred indirectly as none of these studies actually manip-
ulated the meaning of pain (Mohr et al., 2012; Salomons et al.,
2007, 2014; Wiech et al., 2006). It is thus conceivable that
these effects could, for instance, originate from a more gener-
alized increase in self-control, not from the cognitive reeval-
uation of the threatening value of stimuli.
Third, classic reappraisal procedures (in which participants
are actively engaged in the regulation of their affective states)
differ from studies on the perceived controllability of pain in
one other respect: they are far more cognitively demanding
and effortful, because participants are usually required to in-
vent their own ideas of how to reinterpret a given emotion-
evoking stimulus and subsequently to monitor its successful-
ness in reducing or augmenting their affective state. As a con-
sequence, reappraisal engages numerous mental processes,
including 1) elaboration of an emotion-provoking situation;
2) finding an adequate reinterpretation of the situation’s mean-
ing; 3) maintaining the new interpretation in working memo-
ry; 4) tracing one’s own affective state that arises in response
to the modified interpretation; and 5) adjusting the reinterpre-
tation if necessary. Although neglected, all these accompany-
ing processes have the potential to significantly decrease emo-
tional responding even before the conceptual reinterpretation
takes place.
Hence, as a cognitive reappraisal task engages numerous
mental processes (Ochsner, Silvers, & Buhle, 2012) and is one
of the most cognitively demanding means of regulating one’s
emotions (Sheppes, Catran, & Meiran, 2009; Sheppes &
Meiran, 2008), it appears plausible that some of these process-
es have the potential to attenuate emotional response even
before cognitive change takes place. As a matter of fact, our
previous study was exclusively devoted to investigating this
issue, albeit in the visual domain (Wyczesany & Ligeza,
2017). For this reason, we designed a “retro” task that was
aimed to be as similar to a reappraisal task as possible (in
terms of cognitive demand and the required level of cognitive
elaboration) but that would lack the reappraisal-specific pro-
cess of cognitive change. Our results revealed that emotional
responding was reduced by both tasks, regardless of whether
the cognitive change was present or was substituted with a
similarly engaging task related to the picture content. This
finding indicates that the cognitive effort associated with un-
derstanding and elaborating the content of emotional stimuli
(i.e., the essential processes that precede successful reapprais-
al) can significantly contribute to the attenuation of emotional
responses alongside cognitive change.
Taking all this into consideration, the current results seem
to extend these findings to the pain domain. The observed
modulation pattern (NOREG > DWREG, NOREG >
UPREG, DWREG ≠ UPREG) may have resulted from the
additive influence of both cognitive change (that reduced or
escalated pain processing according to the provided
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instruction) and the unspecific cognitive load that was im-
posed on the cognitive system by performing a cognitively
demanding reappraisal task that attenuated neural processing
in both regulation conditions compared with the less cogni-
tively engaging no-regulation condition. The interaction of
these two processes was probably best reflected in the activa-
tion pattern of the left insula, for which comparisons between
all conditions yielded significant effects, with the highest ac-
tivation in the no-regulation condition and the lowest in the
down-regulation condition (NOREG > UPREG > DWREG).
It seems that while in the down-regulation condition both
cognitive change and unspecific cognitive load operated joint-
ly to attenuate pain responses, in the up-regulation condition
the cognitive change acted towards increasing pain process-
ing, whereas cognitive load acted towards decreasing it.
However, the relative impact of unspecific factors seemed to
be more prominent than the influence of cognitive change. It
should be noted here that not all clusters displayed the
NOREG > UPREG > DWREG pattern of activations.
Hence, more research on this topic is needed to further support
this claim.
Although we ascribe the modulatory impact of our proce-
dure to an increase in cognitive load, we failed to observe the
increase in prefrontal activity that was hypothesized to be the
source of modulatory effects. There is no certainty about the
possible cause(s) that could account for the lack of this effect;
however, this lack could pertain to some inherent limitations of
the method used. As highlighted by one of the most compre-
hensive meta-analyses of pain neuroimaging studies, none of
the analyzed EEG or MEG studies managed to record the ac-
tivity of the PFC despite the consistent activation of this struc-
ture that was observed in fMRI studies (Apkarian et al., 2005).
The last issue that remains to be addressed concerns the
question of why we did not observe a similar pattern of neural
modulation to the one that was reported in studies that used an
analogous reappraisal procedure that involved asking partici-
pants to actively up- or down-regulate their pain sensations by
reinterpreting them (Fardo et al., 2015; Lapate et al., 2012;
Woo et al., 2015). One possible explanation appeals to the
method that was used to induce pain. While in our study pain
was induced by phasic electric stimulation lasting 5 ms with
eight stimuli in each session, in the study by Lapate et al.
(2012) and Woo et al. (2015), the authors used painful heat
to stimulate participants for approximately 12–12.5 seconds in
each session. Putatively, this ultrashort and frequently
repeated electric stimulation might have resulted in a distinct
sense of pain that was less prone to reappraisal by means of
reinterpretation. Conversely, Fardo et al. (2015) also used
electric stimulation and observed up- and down-regulation
of the neural response to pain according to the mental imagery
instruction. Because this discrepancy is more difficult to ex-
plain, we suggest that future studies could include several
different pain-induction techniques to shed light on this issue.
Reappraisal, placebo, or hypnotic suggestion?
Our study was devoted to investigating the temporal dynamics
of pain reappraisal, and our procedure was modeled after re-
search on a situation-based cognitive reappraisal strategy
(Ochsner et al., 2004, 2012). However, it is worth noting that
our reappraisal task is somewhat reminiscent of other para-
digms developed to study the impact of beliefs on the pain
experience, such as anticipation/placebo or hypnotic sugges-
tion. All of these forms aim to change cognitively the experi-
ence of one’s pain; however, in the case of placebo, this is
typically achieved by more or less explicitly inducing expec-
tations that pain is less (or more) negative than it really is
(Ploghaus, 1999). Alternatively, in the case of hypnotic sug-
gestion, it is achieved by encouraging hypnosis-prone partic-
ipants to experience comfort and well-being while undergoing
painful stimulation, utilizing as many as eight distinct
suggestion-induction techniques, such as muscle relaxation
and reality detachment (for more details on the hypnotic
analgesia paradigm see Kiernan et al., 1995). Thus, both these
forms rely heavily on environmental cues or externally gener-
ated expectations about pain. In contrast, the reappraisal strat-
egy requires a more active approach towards one’s experience
of pain instead of remaining a passive receiver of various
(often quite elaborate, as in the case of hypnotic analgesia)
forms of ready-made suggestions. This is one of reappraisal’s
greatest assets, because it enables one to take control over the
ongoing pain. Conversely, active engagement also is one of its
greatest shortcomings, because it places the burden of
influencing the pain experience on a suffering individual
who may feel too psychologically overwhelmed to undertake
any (cognitive) actions and/or may lack sufficient faith in their
ability to influence pain sensations, which is required for re-
appraisal to be successful (Ford & Gross, 2018).
Despite the disparities, the resemblance between reapprais-
al and other pain-belief induction procedures, such as placebo
or hypnotic suggestions, also evinces itself at the neural level
(Ploghaus, Becerra, Borras, & Borsook, 2003; Tracey, 2010;
van der Meulen et al., 2017). Notably, a recent fMRI study
that compared placebo and cognitive reappraisal effects on
processing of unpleasant visual material found that both pro-
cedures have a common anxiety-relieving effect that is corre-
lated with attenuation of the amygdala and insula activity and
engages partly overlapping subgenual cingulate-amygdala
pathways to regulate emotions (Zhang, Guo, Zhang, & Luo,
2013). Another study extended these results to the pain do-
main, reporting a positive correlation between placebo-
induced activity in the left dorsolateral PFC and a reduction
in participants’ pain unpleasantness ratings and cognitive re-
appraisal ability scores (van der Meulen et al., 2017). Authors
thus concluded that cognitive restructuring, which underlies
reappraisal regulatory effects, may be a more common mech-
anism that mediates the effects of pain inhibition in placebo
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analgesia (van der Meulen et al., 2017). Although there are no
direct comparisons between cognitive reappraisal and hypnot-
ic suggestion, a recent meta-analysis provides a broadly sim-
ilar picture of hypnosis and reappraisal neural effects, thus
highlighting the role of the ACC as well as the prefrontal,
insular, and somatosensory cortices (Del Casale et al., 2015).
Here, however, the mechanisms that seem to account for pain
reduction in hypnotic analgesia are somewhat different.
Studies have shown that hypnotic analgesia is not only
opiate-independent (which distinguishes it from the opiate-
driven placebo effect), but also depends heavily on the degree
of induced perception distortion/elevation of the perceptual
threshold and the degree of hypnotic suggestibility (Del
Casale et al., 2015). Conceivably, reinterpretation of painful
somatosensory sensations plays a part in hypnoanalgesia as
well, but this possibility is yet to be tested.
Reliability of subjective ratings
A question remains: why did our procedure not affect the
subjective ratings congruently with the observed activations
of clusters, as suggested by neural signatures of pain process-
ing? A convincing explanation would be the explicitness of
the regulatory goal of our task. Although up-regulating pain
sensations via reappraisal failed to enhance neural response in
all but one brain region, participants reported feeling increased
pain intensity and unpleasantness according to the provided
instruction. We suggest that this apparent discrepancy be-
tween the neuronal and subjective measures might be a result
of demand characteristics, which are not uncommon in reap-
praisal studies (Lieberman, Inagaki, Tabibnia, & Crockett,
2011). By having explicit knowledge about the goal of the
regulatory task, participants can bias their ratings in a direction
that is implicitly expected by the researchers. Furthermore,
despite the neuronal or physiological evidence, some studies
have shown that participants are less likely to report modula-
tion of a subjective experience when the regulatory goal is
hidden (Wang & Li, 2017; Wyczesany & Ligeza, 2017;
Yuan, Ding, Liu, & Yang, 2015). It seems that tracking the
subtle changes of an emotional state that has been evoked by
moderately arousing and repeatedly presented affective stim-
uli poses a challenge to untrained or less emotionally reactive
participants, who often bias their ratings based on their beliefs
about what is expected of them.
Limitations and directions for future research
Some limitations of our study should be mentioned. We ex-
amined only healthy female participants, because men and
women respond differently to affective stimulation. We chose
women, because they were shown to be more emotionally
reactive than men but less prone to regulating automatically
their emotions in response to affective stimulation (Domes
et al., 2010; McRae, Ochsner, Mauss, Gabrieli, & Gross,
2008). Therefore, future studies could try to generalize our
results in a sample of men. Moreover, it would be of an inter-
est to examine the effects of reappraisal in a clinical popula-
tion, especially chronic pain patients, as some initial results
indicate that they could benefit from this kind of psychologi-
cal intervention (Lawrence, Hoeft, Sheau, & Mackey, 2011).
It also should be remembered that source localization using
EEGmethods inherently displays some limitations in terms of
accuracy, so the conclusions regarding particular brain struc-
tures should be treated with some caution.
Conclusions
This study investigated the temporal dynamics of the reap-
praisal effect on pain; we found robust evidence that
reinterpreting nociceptive stimulation modulated the
affective-evaluative aspect of pain processing in four function-
ally coupled limbic brain areas (ACC (90–145ms), amygdala/
ATmp (191–266 ms), OFC (188–288 ms)), which can be con-
sidered an early latency effect, and the insula (762–801 ms),
which can be considered a late latency effect. This pattern of
neural activity modulation indicates that reappraisal modulat-
ed pain processing at both the early perceptual (<300 ms) and
the late cognitive-elaboration (>300ms) stages, and the effects
were evident as early as ~100 ms post stimulus onset.
However, contrary to our expectations and to studies that used
an analogous reappraisal procedure, i.e., asking participants to
actively up- or down-regulate their pain sensations (Fardo
et al., 2015; Lapate et al., 2012; Woo et al., 2015), we ob-
served a general attenuation of neural response in one or both
regulation conditions compared with the no-regulation condi-
tion, with no significant differences between them (except
from the insula, for which activity was higher under up- vs.
down-regulation).
Given the consistency of the neural modulation pattern, we
argue that regulatory effects could be driven not only by a
reappraisal-specific process of cognitive change, but also by
other nonspecific factors that are known to reduce emotional
responding. As reappraisal is one of the most cognitively com-
plex forms of emotion regulation, one of the factors that sig-
nificantly diminished emotional responding could have been
the cognitive demand that accompanied the execution of an
effortful reappraisal task. Hence, we found little evidence of
effective up-regulation of pain experience at the neural level.
Subjective ratings, on the other hand, indicated successful
up- and down-regulation according to the given instruction.
However, given the fact that subjective ratings are strongly
affected by demand characteristics and that demand character-
istics are inherently associated with all reappraisal studies in
which the study objective is not hidden from participants, we
suggest that subjective results should be treated with caution.
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To summarize, we found extensive evidence that reapprais-
al modulates pain processing from its earliest stages (~100
ms), but this modulation most probably reflects the joint ef-
fects of cognitive change and the unspecific cognitive load
that accompanies the execution of the experimental task. For
this reason, our study points to the importance of the inclusion
of cautiously selected control conditions that allow incidental
modulation of emotional responses by unspecific cognitive
activity to be distinguished from the specific influence of cog-
nitive change. It also raises the issue of demand characteristics
that is common to all reappraisal studies in which the study
objective is not hidden from participants.
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